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Judicial Law Making:
Intent of Legislature vs. Literal Interpretation
By JA.ms R. BICHARDSON*
"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any
written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the law giver
to all intents and purposes and not the person who first
wrote or spoke them."1
We more or less tacitly accept the proposition that it is the function
of the legislature to make laws and that of the court to give them force
and effect through interpretation.
2
This principle is firmly grounded in the English common law3 and
finds its acceptance in this country through the theory of division of
powers in our government.
The tripartite form of government is not mandatorily or specifi-
cally set up by the federal constitution, but the form of government
provided is in harmony with the doctrine. The instrument does, how-
ever, divide the departments into legislative, judicial and executive
with corresponding functions.
4
Unlike the federal government, forty of the States have specifically
adopted the doctrine in their constitutions.5 This came about in spite
of the fact there was in the early common law s conception of govern-
ment no trace of separation of powers.6 Possibly the doctrine origi-
nates in, and finds itself as a practical application of, the division of
labor to government, with the sound belief that a specialized branch
can function more efficiently than one charged with many duties.
7
* A.B., Eastern Kentucky Teachers College; LL.B., Umversity of Kentucky-
Assoc. Prof. of Law, John B. Stetson Umversity, DeLand, Fla." Gray, THE NATURE AND SourcEs OF = LAW (1921), quotation from Bishop
Hoadley, p. 271.
'U. S. v. American Trucking Ass n., 310 U. S. 534, 60 S. Ct. 1059, 84 L. Ed.
1345 (1939).
"River Wear Comm rs. v. Adamson-House of Lords (1877), 2 Appeals
Cases 743.
" In O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516, 77 L. Ed. 1365, 53 S. Ct.
740 (1933), the Court said: "The Constitution m distributing the powers of gov-
ernment creates three distinct and separate departments This separation is
not merely a matter of convemence or of governmental mechamsm. Its object is
basic and vital namely, to preclude a commingling of these essentially dif-
ferent powers of government in the same hands."
'Horack, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CoNsRuCrToN (3d Ed.) Vol. 1, Sec. 202.
6 Radin, Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 86 U. of Pa. L. R. 842 (1937).
"Pound, Spurous Interpretation, 7 Col. L. R. 385 (1907).
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While recognizing that the division of powers is a powerful mflu-
ence in maintaining a democratic form of government, the three
branches must be looked upon not as independent units but as co-
ordinate branches of the same government under which the functions
of one branch will necessarily at times overlap the other in the inter-
ests of an integrated, smooth-working organization. Fixed separation
or occasional overlapping of functions must be determined by com-
mon sense and the inherent necessities of governmental coordination."
The approach to the subject by the writer has not been intended
in any manner of speaking to either justify or condemn judicial law
making but rather to give some slight background for the proposition
that it is the function of the legislature to enact laws and that it is for
the courts to apply them.
As early as 1584 we find an English court reorganizing the legisla-
tive intent as material in construing a statute,9 and since that date the
search for legislative intent, with the increase of statutory law, has
grown apace rather than abated.
Can a statute be applied to a factual situation without judicial law
making having occurred? It is commonly said that where a statute is
clear and unambiguous on its face it requires no interpretation, the
court merely applies the statute in a somewhat routine manner. Con-
sideration of tis situation would seem to lead one to a logical con-
clusion that the court has in fact interpreted when it decided particular
words were applicable to given facts. If the court finds itself in accord
and harmony with the clear meaning of an act, then the intent of the
legislature and that of the court are in tune.
When a court finds that an act is clear and unambiguous it deter-
mines that the intention of the legislature is apparent from the face of
the statute and it applies the words literally without interpretation."o
The language must be held to mean what it clearly expresses. How-
ever, situations arise where it is plain to be seen that a literal interpre-
tation would reach a result contrary to the intent of the legislature.
Or, perhaps, it is more correctly stated as being an unforeseen situa-
tion and hence, not within the legislative intent.
In cases where a literal interpretation would reach an absurdity,
most generally the courts, not averse to a little unadmitted judicial
law making, will find that the legislature could not have intended such
a result." Unfortunately for the majority of us who would find a
8J. W Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 72 L. Ed. 624, 48
S. Ct. 348 (1928).
9 Heydon s Case, 3 Co. Rep. 72, 76 Eng. Repr. 637 (1584).
"People ex rel. Wood v. Sands, 102 Cal. ].2, 36 Pac 404 (1894)." Pierce v. Van Dusen, 78 Fed. 693 (1897).
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magic formula of interpretation acceptable, the courts are not in har-
mony in the decisions, possibly because what is an absurdity to one is
not an absurdity to another.
A very clear cut example of a case in which a literal interpretation
would create an absurd result is one in which the State sought to con-
fiscate a car which was used for the transportation of liquor by one
who had stolen it from the owner.12  The applicable statute pro-
vided that:
"Any motor vehicle used for the transportation of liquor
within the st;te is hereby declared a common nuisance and may be
confiscated upon proceedings instituted by the state."
The court was undeniably correct in its holding that the legislature
could not have intendel by the act that an innocent owner s car should
be confiscated. To apply the act literally would impute to the legisla-
ture an absurd and wrongful intent it seems. This result is represen-
tative of necessary judicial law making.
As pointed out the above rule is not consistently followed, or else
we are not all in agreement as to what is an absurdity The court may
apply the literal rule, while finding that a hardship results and in effect
say that if such be the case the remedy is for the legislature not the
courts.
In Chung Fook v Whitei 3 the statute provided:
"That if the person sending for wife or minor children is
naturalized, a wife to whom marred or a minor child born subsequent
to such husband or father s naturalization shall be admitted without
detention for treatment in hospital "
The act referred to persons found to be infected with a contagious
disease, and Chung Fook, a native-born citizen sought to have his alien
wife admitted without detention in a hospital.
The court refused to hold the act applicable to native-born citizens,
saying that if the act unjustly discriminates against native-born citizens
the remedy lies with Congress. It found the words clear and unam-
biguous and found its duty in such case was to apply the law as writ-
ten, if not unconstitutional. Was not this a plausible and opportune
case for finding that as the legislature extended a privilege to natur-
alized citizens a fortiori it intended it to apply to native-born citizens?
The decision undoubtedly causes the statute to place a premium on
naturalization, and conversely a penalty on citizenship. The only logi-
cal conclusion is that the court failed or refused to use legislative
intent as a criterion, avoiding judicial legislation.
" State v. Goyette, 140 Kan. 732, 37 P 2d 1001 (1934).
u 264 U. S. 443. 68 L. Ed. 781, 44 S. Ct. 361 (1924).
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Again in a case decided in 1916 the United States Supreme Court
disregarded legislative intent.14 The case involved an alleged viola-
tion of the White Slave Traffic Act, which made unlawful the inter-
state transportation of a woman or girl, "to become a prostitute or to
give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral
practice." 
%
It was argued that the act was directed at commercialized vice
only, and although Caminetti's conduct, in taking a woman across a
state line to become his mistress, was reprehensible it was not within
the purview of the act. The court's answer to this argument was that
admittedly the defendant's actions brought him within the language
of the act, "any other immoral purposes." It thus applied the rule that
the meaning of an act must first be sought in the language thereof,
and if the meaning is clear and within constitutional authority the sole
function of the court is to apply it.
The dissent was more forward-looking and comprehensive. It con-
sidered the title of the act as significant. Further, the surrounding
circumstances at the time the act was passed were emphasized. The
dissent found that commercialized vice was the evil to be cured and
that Congress had no intent as to such personal escapades, though cer-
tainly to be frowned upon.
Perhaps the most enlightening part of the dissent is the expression
that there is danger in extending an act beyond its purpose through a
literal interpretation. Very practically the opportunity for black-
mailers of both sexes to operate under this decision was recogmzed.
Twenty-four years prior to the Cammetti case the Supreme Court
rendered an irreconcilable opinion in which it stated that "all laws
should receive a sensible construction," and permitted an immigrant
preacher to accept a contract of employment in this country, though
prohibited by the language of a statute.15
The act made it unlawful to bring an alien into this country to
perform labor or services of any kind under an agreement made prior
to the migration or importation.
Here again was an admitted violation of the act under a literal
interpretation. The court looked to the purpose of the act which was
to prevent floods of cheap labor and found that importation of a mm-
ister did not come within the spirit or intent of the act though literally
it was within the prohibition "or service of any kind."
I Cannetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 61 L. Ed. 442, 37 Sup. Ct.
192 (1916).
" Church of the Holy Tnnity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 86 L. Ed. 226,
12 S. Ct. 511 (1891). -.
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Whilst wrestling with conflicting opinions, we must charitably
recognize that the courts are wrestling with an onerous problem in
deciding whether or not to permit legislative intent as conceived by
the court to override the literal meaning. Whenever a factual situa-
tion is within the language of an act, and yet by sound reasoning and
logic it would seem not to have been so intended the result of the
decision is of impelling consideration. One s conscience is not shocked
by the Caminetti case, wherein an act nmoral and illegal in any event
is punished by a literal construction. Nor are one s legal concepts
violently shaken when the language of an act is ignored, thereby per-
mitting a minister of the gospel to enter the country
In a federal case'0 the court had occasion to construe a rather
peculiar Kentucky Statute17 providing that a corporation may provide
"that holders of its preferred stock shall be entitled, upon terms pre-
scribed by it, to convert the same into the bonds or other obligations
of the corporation." Under this statute a debtor corporation had per-
mitted, by provision in its articles of incorporation, a conversion of
preferred stock into mortgage bonds. The court held that the holders
of stock who made such conversion thereby changing themselves into
creditors of the corporation acquired no priority over existing geiieral
creditors upon reorganization of the corporation in bankruptcy
This decision may aptly be described as an example of judicial con-
struction benevolently applied so that the option to change from a
shareholder to that of a creditor could not be exercised prejudicially
to dilute the security of existing creditors. The court refused to give
a literal construction to the language of a statute which was contrary
to sound legislative policy, justice and common sense. The case is a
working example of judicial law making, a phrase the courts them-
selves have coined as descriptive of an infringement of the legislative
prerogative.
Not only does the attempt to determine legislative intent arise by
necessity in many instances where a literal interpretation is patently
inequitable but also, and more frequently, in cases where the statute
to be construed is ambiguous. That is, the language used is not
clearly expressed as a result of which the objectives of the act are
doubtful. 18 Again ambiguity may result from two different sections
of an act being in apparent conflict.19 It is then the function of the
"'In Re Phoenix Hotel Co. of Lexington, Ky., 83 F (2) 724 (C.C.A.), Cert.
Demed, 299 U. S. 568.
'7Ky. Stats. 564-1 (K.R.S. 271.140).
"River Wear Comm s. v. Adamson (supra).
I Comm. v. Mullins 296 Ky. 190, 176 S.W (2) 403 (1943).
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court to read the one in the light of the other and reconcile them if
possible, thereby determining the true intent of the legislature.
The courts generally feel justified in referring to all relevant mat-
ters in determining the legislative intent. As to what is relevant, there
are various aids to which the courts may have recourse in pinnng
down the sometimes elusive legislative intent. Basically we may say
it is extremely doubtful that upon any given enactment each and every
legislator voting in the affirmative had a specific intent which was
thereby integrated into a determinable group intent as to the enacted
statute. Any such conclusion would mean that practical legislative
procedure had been ignored. It would indicate that such theory fails
to take into consideration voting along party lines, reciprocal voting,
special interests and "band wagon voting." It is then erroneous to
subjectively seek the intent of an entire legislative body
In the light of present day legislative procedure possibly one of the
best reflectors of legislative intent is the committee investigation and
report. The complexities of our modern society combined with the
ever growing mass of proposed legislation which face our short session,
sometimes ill informed legislatures make the legislative committee a
potent and useful legislative arm.
In a given case where a bill has been referred to committee and
that committee has carried on an exhaustive and comprehensive hear-
ing prior to making its report and recommendation to the legislative
body, it is xeasonable to assume that the purpose or intent descem-
ible from the committee procedure was adopted by the legislative
body upon enacting the bill into law
The courts in general will look to such extrinsic aid in construing
an ambiguous statute, as part of the legislative history of an act.20 The
intent of the legislature becames the mischief at which the statute was
aimed as revealed by the committee hearing.
21
I In a Supreme Court case22 the court had occasion to refer to a re-
port of the Committee of Agriculture as furnishing the contempor-
aneous history of the evils to be remedied upon which the bill was
framed.
As a general proposition it may be said that the court will not use
-general floor discussion on a bill as an extrinsic aid to interpretation.
It has been held that debates in Congress are not appropriate sources
' Gneb v. National Bank of Kentucky s Receiver, 252 Ky. 753, 68 S.W (2)
21 (1934).
'Amos v. Conkling, 99 Fla. 206, 126 So. 283 (1930).
' Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 66 L. Ed. 735, 42 S. Ct. 397 (1922).
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of information from which to discover the meaning of a statute passed
by that body 
2 3
Yet we find a federal court referring to a debate in Congress on an
amendment to a bill and quoting therefrom as indicative of intent.
24
Consideration of the problem will reasonably lead one to the con-
clusion that possibly as a general rule floor discussion is not a reliable
indicator of legislative intent. Yet, it is clear that when floor discussion
centers on the purpose of a particular portion of a proposed bill and
this is followed by passage of the bill the court would be amply justi-
fied in referring to such debate in construing a doubtful statute. This
the court did in the case last above cited.
Where the intent of the law making body is doubtful and obscure
the courts will look to legislative history of the act or statutes relating
to the same subject, i.e., in pan materia.
In United States v Pfitsch2- the court was called upon to construe
a section of an act which apparently conferred exclusive original juris-
diction on the District Courts, while another section gave such jurisdic-
tion concurrently to the District Courts and Court of Claims in trying
certain types of claims for compensation against the United States.
There appeared no good reason for such distinction, but by reference
to other such acts the court found that Congress had established three
distinct jursdictions for the purpose of suits against the Government.
This reference to extrinsic aid led the court to the decision that the
apparently aimless distinction was not such, but rather intended by
Congress.
It hag been suggested that in cases where the court cannot discern
the legislative purpose they might rather than declare the statute void
on grounds of indefiniteness or uncertainty apply a "reasonable legis-
lature" test comparable to the "reasonable man" instruction in negli-
gence cases.2 6 That is, the court would consider the evil to be cured
and from the language available from the statute arrive at a decision
as to what a reasonable legislature would probably intend under the
circumstances.
The suggestion is not objectionable on its face except possibly to
those critics who condemn legislative intent construction as judicial
law making. It is certainly a step further in developing the field of
legislative intent.
A juror in deciding what a reasonable man would do under the
'Dunlap v. United States, 173 U. S. 65, 43 L. Ed. 616, 19 S. Ct. 319 (1893).
a'Gosnell v. Spang, 84 F 2d. 889 (C.C.A. 3, 1936).z256 U. S. 547, 65 L. Ed. 1084, 41 S. Ct. 569 (1920).
" Horack, Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, See. 4508.
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same and similar circumstances sets himself up as that reasonable man.
A judge in determining what a reasonable legislature intended would
use his own thoughts and ideas as the standard of reasonableness.
This is inescapable, but not necessarily objectionable as the court's
standards of morals, ethics and logic assert themselves in any opinion.
The suggestion has its merits in that it is consistent with the maxm
that we do not presume the legislature intended to do a futile thing.
Presumptions favor the validity of an act and all doubts are resolved
in favor of constitutionality 
27
Critics of the legislative intent doctrine fear the usurpation of the
legislative function by the court. The plain answer is that a real
usurpation cannot take place so long as the two departments of gov-
ernment are permitted to function independently Any ensuing ses-
sion of a legislature may repeal, reenact, amend or in some junsdic-
tions declare its intent if a decision does not satisfactorily or correctly
interpret its intent.
They further take the view that legislative intent as such is not
discoverable.28  This is to ignore realities, legislative procedure. how
courts function in any event, and assume that bare words m a statute
can stand alone and impart their meaning to a situation without judi-
cial application.
Finally, proponents of codification of the laws express the views
that complete codification would divorce our legislative and judicial
departments thereby bringing about realism of our maxim of gov-
ernment that the same person should not be both law giver and judge.29
The answer is that codification can accomplish that result if it can
be made to cover all conceivable situations that may arise between
persons in their relations, and all future transactions that may occur.
Then will "reason, science and conscience"30 be eliminated from the
law, judicial law making will be gone and all the law will be on the
shelf available, clear, and an open book to the layman and lawyer alike.
' State v. Roby, 142 Ind. 168, 41 N.E. 145 (1895).
' Radin, Statutory Interpretation (1930), 48 HARiv. L. R. 863.
'David D .Field, Codification (1886), 20 Am. L. REv. 1.
' James C. Carter, Promnces of the Written and Unwritten Law, 24 Aw. L.
REv. 1. (1890).
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